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WHY DOES LORD DENNING’S LEAD BALLOON INTRIGUE
US STILL? THE PROSPECTS OF FINDING A UNIFYING
PRINCIPLE FOR DURESS, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND
UNCONSCIONABILITY
Marcus Moore*
Somerville College, University of Oxford
Recently, a workshop in contract law held at the University of Oxford caused me
to recall the sense I had some years ago, when I first came across duress, undue
influence, and unconscionability in first-year Contract, that these doctrines had
much in common despite their described differences. That point, of course, had
been recognised before. Lord Denning, in Lloyds Bank v Bundy,1 had gone further,
asserting that they were expressions of a common principle of “inequality of
bargaining power”. Denning’s principle did not get off the ground with the House
of Lords, despite much discussion of it in lower courts and academic texts. And I
myself found the notion difficult to climb aboard. The question that the workshop
returned my thoughts to, and which I address in this paper, is whether there is
some way to fix Denning’s trial balloon—to modify it into something actually
capable of taking flight.

I. Introduction
1. The Bundy Opinion: Lord Denning’s lead balloon?
To this day, the 1975 English Court of Appeal judgment in Bundy remains a staple
of first-year Contract courses in law faculties across the common law world. Most
lawyers remember well from their student days the sympathetic portrait painted
by Denning’s minority opinion of “poor old man” Bundy whose fatherly love for
his indebted son led him to give security in the family’s centuries-long home at
Yew Tree Farm to his trusted bank, only to have the bank foreclose and put him
out to ruin.2 Not for this entertainingly colourful description of facts, however,
have law professors kept the opinion part of the Contract canon; rather it is because,
after surveying doctrines such as duress, undue influence, and unconscionability,
Denning posited that they were instances of an underlying principle granting
avoidance of a contract for what he called “inequality of bargaining power”.3
Denning’s proposition attracted sympathy from the majority, but they declined to
state an opinion on it.4 In later cases, it received negative treatment in the House

*
I am grateful to Stephen Smith and Hugh Beale for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. All of the
remaining errors are my own.
1
[1975] Q.B. 326; [1974] 3 All E.R. 757.
2
Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326 at 334.
3
Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326 at 339.
4
Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326 at 347. The majority reached the result on the basis of undue influence.
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of Lords,5 leading the author of one popular Contract text to refer to it as “Lord
Denning’s lead balloon”.6

2. What explains 40 years of expert fixation?
However, four decades of continued study of Denning’s Bundy opinion in contract
courses, plus prime real estate in Contract textbooks devoted to discussing his
supposed principle,7 suggest that, whatever conclusions are variously drawn as to
the balloon’s construction, there is at least still some hot air in it. Ewan
McKendrick, for instance, says that the “issue of whether a doctrine of inequality
of bargaining power exists in English law has been one of some controversy”.8
John McCamus adds that:
“Lord Denning’s suggestion that these existing doctrines can be rationalised
and restated in the form of a single principle of ‘inequality of bargaining
power’ is a bold and interesting one.”9
Others seem to incline towards enthusiasm for it. Sir Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows
and John Cartwright write that while the doctrines remain separate “at present”:
“whether the courts might yet be willing to take the step of unifying the
doctrines of duress, undue influence, and unconscionable bargains, as Lord
Denning sought to do, remains uncertain”.10
Stephen Waddams similarly says that:
“[the] statement is of interest. It openly recognises that behind a number of
lines of cases, each formerly explained on different grounds as special
exceptions, there lies a common theme”.11
Indeed, typically one finds in the layout of Contract materials, that these
doctrines are studied together as part of a “cluster”,12 separate from other
contract-“policing” doctrines like misrepresentation, mistake, and illegality. In
Harry v Kreutziger, Lambert J.A. stated that Lord Denning’s principle was not a
“touchstone” but a “demonstration that the categories of grounds for rescission
are interrelated and based on a common foundation”.13 Many academic reflections
have also commented on Denning’s supposed foundation, or proposed alterations.
So much has been written on these issues that it is unquestionably impossible to
review and respond to it all. Nonetheless, the fact that the conversation continues,
both at a level of general engagement, and at a deeper level through ongoing
5
National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] 1 A.C. 686; [1985] 1 All E.R. 821 (Lord Scarman); Pao On v
Lau Yiu Long [1980] A.C. 614; [1979] 3 All E.R. 65 (Lord Scarman).
6
Neil Andrews, Contract Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), at p.316.
7
See e.g., Andrews, Contract Law (2015), at p.315 et seq.; Sir Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows and John Cartwright,
Anson’s Law of Contract, 29th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at p.376 et seq.; Ewan McKendrick,
Contract Law, 11th edn (London: Palgrave, 2015), at p.303 et seq.; Hugh Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 32nd edn
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), Vol.1, para.8-143; J.W. Carter, Contract Law in Australia, 6th edn (Chatswood:
LexisNexis, 2012). See also Christopher Carr, “Inequality of Bargaining Power” (1975) 38 M.L.R. 463.
8
McKendrick, Contract Law (2015), at p.303 et seq.
9
McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2nd edn (Toronto: Irwin, 2012), at p.381.
10
Anson’s Law of Contract (2010), at pp.376–377.
11
Stephen Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 6th edn (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2010), at para.524.
12
McCamus, Law of Contracts (2012), at p.378.
13
[1978] B.C.J. No.1318; (1978) 95 D.L.R. (3d) 231 at [25].
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attempts to accomplish Denning’s goal in whole or part, strongly suggests that
there is something there, though not quite attained yet. If Denning’s “inequality
of bargaining power” did not correctly identify the common principle, could it be
that sustained scholarly interest in his attempt evinces a collective intuition that
one does exist, capable of attracting a reasonable consensus if more accurately
articulated?

3. Outline of the paper
i) Thesis
This paper argues that a common principle does exist—properly articulated as
exploitation of constrained autonomy. More precisely, each of the doctrines enables
a contract to be avoided where the party seeking to uphold it exploited a serious
constraint on the other party’s free consideration of whether to enter the contract.
A unified test should ask: (1) whether such a constraint existed (e.g. as a result of
pressure, influence, disability or other factors), and if so, (2) whether it was
exploited by the other party in that it (actually or constructively) knew of the
constraint, and yet formed a contract with the constrained party.

ii) Structure
This paper proceeds in three parts: Pt II briefly reviews the doctrines of duress,
undue influence, and unconscionability, as necessary for the subsequent discussion
of whether they reflect an underlying principle. Part III considers Lord Denning’s
suggestions of a unifying principle, and other subsequent proposals these inspired,
examining some apparent flaws which may explain why none has been accepted
by the jurisprudence. Part IV outlines the principle I propose, and explains how it
underlies duress, undue influence and unconscionability, while rectifying the
perceived frailties of previous unifying formulations. The concluding Pt V briefly
reinforces why, if an underlying principle exists, it should be openly recognised.

II. The Doctrines
Before considering possible common foundations, it serves to summarise the
relevant key features of each doctrine.

1. Duress
Duress is of common law origin. In Contract, it now has three branches: (1) duress
to person, founded on violence or threats to the security of a person or family
members;14 (2) duress as to goods, which refers to actual or threatened damage or
improper detention of the other party’s property;15 and (3) economic duress, which
involves illegitimate pressure or threats against the other party’s economic
14
Barton v Armstrong [1976] A.C. 104; [1975] 2 All E.R. 465; Re Craig [1971] Ch. 95; [1970] 2 All E.R. 390;
Saxon v Saxon [1976] B.C.J. No.1309; [1976] 4 W.W.R. 300; Byle v Byle [1990] B.C.J. No.258; (1990) 65 D.L.R.
(4th) 641.
15
Skeate v Beale (1841) 11 Ad. & El. 983; 113 E.R. 688; Maskell v Horner [1915] 3 K.B. 106; Astley v Reynolds
(1731) 2 Str. 915; 93 E.R. 939; Pople v Dauphin [1921] 2 W.W.R. 276; (1921) 60 D.L.R. 30; E. Allan Farnsworth,
Contracts, 4th edn (New York: Aspen, 2004), at p.257.
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interests.16 In any of these cases, the result must be that the other party had no
practical choice but to consent to the contract.17 Further, there must be a sufficient
causal link between the pressure or threat and the consent obtained.18 Once these
requirements have been established, the usual remedy is that the contract is
voidable.19

2. Undue influence
Undue influence is an equitable doctrine. It renders a contract voidable where one
party has abused a relationship with another party to influence the latter’s assent
to a contract.20 This need not take the form of pressure, as in duress, but may consist
in subtler forms of manipulation, or even passive failure to emancipate the party
from dependence or excessive reliance on the other.21
Undue influence has been said to encompass two distinguishable streams: (1)
actual undue influence, where the party seeking to avoid the contract directly
establishes the above elements;22 and (2) presumed undue influence, where the law
presumes influence if a party in a relationship of vulnerability or dependence on
another makes a contract with that party which is unfavourable so as to “call for
explanation”.23 In Etridge, the House of Lords described these as two distinct ways
of proving one “doctrine” of undue influence, rather than two different doctrines;
nevertheless, the distinction remains extremely useful analytically, precisely because
it draws attention to these two distinct ways of proving undue influence, one of
which relies on the availability of a presumption under specific conditions, as
highlighted later throughout this paper.24

16
Occidental Worldwide Investment Corp v Skibs A/S Avanti (The Sibeon & The Sibotre) [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.
293 (Kerr J.); North Ocean Shipping Co v Hyundai Construction (The Atlantic Baron) [1979] Q.B. 705; [1978] 3 All
E.R. 1170; Atlas Express v Kafco [1989] Q.B. 833; [1989] 1 All E.R. 641; Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] A.C. 614;
R. v Attorney General for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22; [2003] E.M.L.R. 24.
17
Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation (The Universe Sentinel)
[1983] 1 A.C. 366; [1982] 2 All E.R. 67 (Lord Scarman); B&S Contracts and Design v Victor Green Publications
[1984] I.C.R. 419; (1984) 81 L.S.G. 893 (Kerr L.J.); Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Washington: American Law
Institute, 1981), at para.175(1).
18
What qualifies as sufficient is a matter of some uncertainty. See McKendrick, Contract Law (2015), at pp.294–297;
Matthew Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18
N.Z.U.L.R. 509 at 511; Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), para.175 comment c.
19
IFR Ltd v Federal Trade SpA [2001] EWHC 519 (Comm); 2001 WL 1677001; Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980]
A.C. 614; Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation (The Evia Luck) (No.2) [1992] 2
A.C. 152 at 165; [1991] 4 All E.R. 871 at 878 per Lord Goff; Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), at para.175.
There is some debate whether, in duress to person, the contract is void or voidable. Waddams’ argument that consistency
demands the latter is persuasive: Law of Contracts (2010).
20
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No.2) [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 A.C. 773; R. v Attorney-General for England
and Wales [2003] E.M.L.R. 24 (Lord Hoffmann); National Commercial Bank (Jamaica) v Hew [2003] UKPC 51
(Lord Millett); Randall v Randall [2004] EWHC 2258; [2005] W.T.L.R. 119; Turkey v Awadh [2005] EWCA Civ
382; [2005] 2 F.C.R. 7; Davies v AIB Group [2012] EWHC 2178 (Ch); [2012] 2 P. & C.R. 19 (Norris J.).
21
Etridge [2002] 2 A.C. 773; Thompson v Foy [2009] EWHC 1076 (Ch); [2010] 1 P. & C.R. 16; National
Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] 1 A.C. 686; Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch. D. 145; Farnsworth, Contracts
(2004), at p.516; Rick Bigwood, “Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?” (1996) 16 O.J.L.S.
503 at 513.
22
Williams v Bailey (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 200; CIBC Mortgages v Pitt [1994] 1 A.C. 200; [1993] 4 All E.R. 433.
23
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No.2) [2002] 2 A.C. 773; Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch. D. 145; CIBC v
Rowatt [2002] O.J. No.4109; (2002) 61 O.R. (3d) 737; Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable
Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R. 509 at 514.
24
Etridge [2002] 2 A.C. 773 at [107], [157]–[158] and [219] (framing the distinction as evidential). See also Sir
Kim Lewison, “Under the Influence” [2011] R.L.R.1 at 1–3. For the distinction, see Bank of Credit & Commerce
International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 Q.B. 923; [1992] 4 All E.R. 955; Peter Birks and Nyuk Yin Chin, “On the Nature
of Undue Influence” in Sir Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedman (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997). Birks and Chin consider them two different doctrines.
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The cases relying on the presumption fall into two further sub-groups:25 the
so-called group “2a” applies to relationships such as solicitor-client, teacher-pupil,
spiritual advisor-follower, trustee-beneficiary, formally conceived as relationships
of trust, confidence, loyalty, dependence or the like, so that such qualities are
deemed to apply. For other relationships within the residual category so-called
“2b”, it must be proved that, whatever the form of the relationship, it had these
qualities in practice.26 Once a relationship having such qualities is established
(deemed under 2a, or proven under 2b), the focus of the inquiry shifts to whether
the substance of the transaction favours the stronger party with a disparity that
“calls for explanation”. If so, unless the party seeking to uphold the contract can
prove that influence deriving from the relationship was not used to procure the
contract, it will be voidable.27

3. Unconscionability
The doctrine of unconscionability also derives from equity. Its requirements were
summarised by Blair J. in Strydom v Vendside:
“one party has to have been disadvantaged in some relevant way as regards
the other party, that other party must have exploited that disadvantage in some
morally culpable manner, and the resulting transaction must be overreaching
and oppressive”.28
The third-mentioned condition means that the transaction must have a substantive
disparity that requires explanation.29
The moral culpability requirement consists in making a contract with another
party whilst consciously exploiting certain disadvantages30 it may have such as
poverty,31 need,32 “ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the language of
the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar disability”.33 Thus,
where the benefiting party is unaware of the other’s impairment, there is no
unconscionability.34 As with presumptive undue influence, the wrongful conduct
25

Aboody [1990] 1 Q.B. 923; Etridge [2002] 2 A.C. 773.
Aboody [1990] 1 Q.B. 923; Etridge [2002] 2 A.C. 773; Geffen v Goodman Estate [1991] 2 S.C.R. 353. For the
view that category 2b is not conceptually distinct, but merely a difference in what must be directly proven rather than
inferred, see e.g., Etridge [2002] 2 A.C. 773 at [107] per Lord Hobhouse.
27
On whether the transaction “calls for explanation,” see Evans v Lloyd [2013] EWHC 1725 (Ch); [2013] W.T.L.R.
1137; Turkey v Awadh [2005] 2 F.C.R. 7; Thompson v Foy [2010] 1 P. & C.R. 16. On disproof: Hackett v Crown
Prosecution Service [2011] EWHC 1170 (Admin); [2011] Lloyd’s Rep. F.C. 371.
28
[2009] EWHC 2130 (QB); [2009] 6 Costs L.R. 886 at [36]. See also the Australian cases Blomley v Ryan [1956]
HCA 81; (1956) 99 C.L.R. 362 and Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 C.L.R.
447.
29
Alec Lobb v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 1 W.L.R. 87; [1983] 1 All E.R. 944.
30
J.L. Barton, “The Enforcement of Hard Bargains” (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 118 at 140; Chitty on Contracts (2015), at
paras 8-133 and 8-135.
31
Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch. D. 312; Strydom v Vendside [2009] 6 Costs L.R. 886; Alec Lobb v Total Oil [1983] 1
W.L.R. 87 at 94–95 per Peter Millett Q.C.; Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C.L.R. 362 at 415 per Kitto J.
32
Stephen Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts” (1976) 39 M.L.R. 369 at 386; Blomley (1956) 99 C.L.R.
362.
33
Cain v Clarica Life Insurance, 2005 ABCA 437; (2005) 263 D.L.R. (4th) 368 at [32]; David Capper, “The
Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World” (2010) 126 L.Q.R. 403. For a similar list, see also Blomley
(1956) 99 C.L.R. 362 at 405 (Fullagar J.) and 415 (Kitto J.). The latter adds “other circumstances [that] affect [one’s]
ability to conserve [one’s] own interests”. Mindy Chen-Wishart sums up these areas of intervention by saying that
they reflect concerns of “decency and good faith. Unconscionability is a mechanism for imposing on parties the
judicial conscience”: “Unconscionable Bargains: What are the courts doing?” (LLM Thesis, University of Otago,
1987), at p.146.
34
Hart v O’Connor [1985] A.C. 1000 at 1018; [1985] 2 All E.R. 880 at 887.
26
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requirement of unconscionability need not be proved by the weaker party, but may
be presumed to have occurred where substantive disparity is evident.35 In that case,
unless the party asserting the contract can show that the transaction was “fair, just
and reasonable”, the contract may be voided.36
It should be cautioned that in the US, unconscionability doctrine means
something different.37 Across the Commonwealth, unconscionability is not entirely
monolithic; but what differences may exist38 are comparatively modest enough
that it is sufficient for purposes of this paper to speak of a Commonwealth case
law doctrine of unconscionability.39 Some unhelpful confusion40 has resulted from
shared terminology between the Commonwealth doctrine, and the US one,41 as
well as statutory “unconscionability” provisions:42 these are each different matters
than the Commonwealth case law doctrine.
35

Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R.

509.
36

Anson’s Law of Contract (2010), at p.373.
This resulted from the influence of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) “Unconscionable contract or clause”
provision (enacted in many states): UCC para.2-302, comment 1. The provision governed sale of goods, and was not
meant to codify the case law doctrine of unconscionability, but was a tool for judges to deal with “unfair surprise”
clauses more directly than by manipulating rules of interpretation, offer and acceptance, determining clauses as against
public order, etc. Further, the consequence differed: non-enforcement of the individual clause, not rescission of the
contract as under the case law doctrine. United States courts then extended the UCC approach from sale of goods to
general application, effectively superseding the older case law doctrine. This is evident from the description of
unconscionability under US law in the leading case Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co 350 F.2d 445 (1965)
(D.C. Cir.). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), at para.208; Farnsworth, Contracts (2004), at para.4.28.
The US unconscionability doctrine is therefore tangentially related to the Commonwealth case law unconsionability
doctrine.
Post-UCC, other jurisdictions including Australia and Canadian provinces also enacted statutory provisions different
from the case law doctrine but using the term “unconscionability”. See Australian Consumer Law ss.21–22, 232,
236–237 and 243; for Canada, see summary in Waddams, “Unconscionability in Canadian Contract Law” (1992) 14
Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Ann. 541. Section 20 of the Australian Consumer Law does codify the case law doctrine
(to authorise financial penalties as a remedy and curtail case law defences such as affirmation or implied waiver):
see Carter, Contract Law in Australia (2012), at p.530 et seq.
38
An example of differences in application of the case law doctrine of unconscionability within the Commonwealth
is that Australian courts since CBA v Amadio (1983) 151 C.L.R. 447, and perhaps indirectly influenced by the statutory
“unconscionability” enactments, are more likely to deal with cases overlapping unconscionability and undue influence
using unconscionability where English courts might use undue influence.
39
Despite the pattern in fn.38 above, the articulation of unconscionability is consistent in England and Australia.
And where cases are analysed under unconscionability in these countries’ courts, the application is not significantly
different.
40
Some confusion arises from the name: Cartwright for example says “[t]here is a danger in using such a phrase
as unconscionable bargains that … it can be thought that the courts are concerned only with the fairness of the bargain”:
Unequal Bargaining: A Study of Vitiating Factors in the Formation of Contracts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991),
at p.216. See also Chitty on Contracts (2015), at para.8-130: “it remains doubtful in modern law to what extent there
is any general equitable principle entitling the courts to interfere with freedom of contract on the ground that the
contract (or a part of it) is, in all the circumstances of the case, a harsh and unconscionable bargain”. Confusion is
also evident from the markedly different ways in which contract textbooks approach unconscionability. Most treat
it as a doctrine alongside duress and undue influence within a related cluster. But some discuss it under the umbrella
of inequality of bargaining power. Some do not discuss unconscionability at all. And Waddams includes duress and
undue influence within unconscionability.
41
However, the US position “has not given birth to a body of … Commonwealth authority evolving the case law
doctrine along American lines … There is very little evidence [of this] in the decided cases”: McCamus, Law of
Contracts (2012), at p.432.
42
In Canada, McCamus notes that the Supreme Court’s judgments in Hunter Engineering v Syncrude Canada
[1989] S.C.J. No.23; [1989] 1 S.C.R. 426 and Tercon Contractors v British Columbia [2010] S.C.J. No.4; [2010] 1
S.C.R. 69 are seemingly decided under the Commonwealth case law doctrine. Yet, without proposing to alter it, nor
to generalise the reach of Canadian specialised statutory provisions as US courts did, they effect an American-style
resolution; see McCamus, Law of Contracts (2012), at pp.442–445. The term’s use in fact goes far beyond those
discussed here: see Waddams, Law of Contracts (2010). As I see it, overall confusion seems to arise from the case
law originally (and still) simultaneously using “unconscionable” simply as an adjective factually to describe exploitative
advantage-taking in equity. In certain special kinds of contexts (well-elaborated by Waddams), that factual conclusion
suffices to ground a remedy, hence in those contexts it amounts to a legal doctrine. In other contexts, it is merely one
consideration (see e.g., Carter, Contract Law in Australia (2012), at pp.519–520). And the case law doctrine of
unconscionability is one where unconscionable conduct is a necessary but not sufficient condition: a special disability
must be exploited, and the result overreaching or oppressive, for the doctrine to apply.
37
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III. Review and Evaluation of Prior Conceptions of the Unifying
Principle
I now review Lord Denning’s formulation, variations, and related proposals by
others, of the perceived common principle uniting duress, undue influence, and
unconscionability.43
I discuss each formulation’s useful insights, as well as apparent shortcomings
in seeking to consolidate the individual doctrines—which may explain why none
has been accepted by the jurisprudence.

1. “Inequality of bargaining power”
The common principle candidate to be assessed first is “inequality of bargaining
power”—the label that Lord Denning gave to his proposed principle in Bundy.
An inequality of bargaining power means that the parties stand on relatively
unequal footing as they head into the contracting process, as regards the degree
of personal freedom they carry into the process of deciding whether to contract
and the degree of personal empowerment they carry into the process of negotiating
terms.
The concept has played an important role in the quest to identify the common
principle uniting duress, undue influence, and unconscionability. Denning’s idea
that these boil down to circumstances of “inequality of bargaining power” is what
got the conversation started about whether a common foundation exists. The
suggestion attracted much subsequent attention and reaction, including, in John
Cartwright’s estimation,44 Lord Scarman’s disapproval of Denning’s Bundy opinion
in the higher courts. And the notion has remained a fixture within other more
complex formulations of a common principle.
For two of the doctrines—unconscionability and presumed undue influence—it
may fairly be said that inequality of bargaining power describes part of what they
require. As detailed in Pt II, within these doctrines, one does not prove
unconscionable conduct or undue influence. Rather, such conduct is presumed,
absent contrary evidence, from disparity in a bargain made between two parties
having highly unequal bargaining power—whether in the nature of the relationship
(in presumed undue influence) or from certain kinds of disadvantage of the weaker
party (in unconscionability).
Further, while the other two doctrines, duress and actual undue influence, do
not require proof of any inequality of bargaining power, it may often be that such
an inequality factually attends the circumstances. For example, a case made on
the basis of actual undue influence will frequently be one where the doctrine of
presumed undue influence could have been invoked, but there was no need to rely
on it and its presumption, because persuasive direct proof of the influence was
available. Similarly, the broadest category of duress is economic, which can occur
43
While, as mentioned, an exhaustive account of other proposals is not possible here, surveying some notable
attempts will help chart the course from Bundy to the thesis this paper advances.
44
Cartwright suggests this attention distracted from a different, more complex, and more promising principle (to
be discussed in Pt III.2, below) that Denning detailed beyond the label, so that “the choice of ‘inequality of bargaining
power’ as the catchword [was] unfortunate”: Unequal Bargaining: A Study of Vitiating Factors in the Formation of
Contracts (1991), at p.220. But many commentators, following Denning, were interested in the inequality of bargaining
power idea discussed in this section, and to what extent it could work: see e.g., Thal, “The Inequality of Bargaining
Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness” (1988) 8 O.J.L.S. 17 at 26.
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where one party is stuck in an economically compromised bargaining position,
creating an opportunity for the other party to benefit from applying the improper
pressure that causes duress.
Beyond the significance “inequality of bargaining power” actually has within
the doctrines, it obviously holds conceptual appeal as a unifying principle candidate
due to its simplicity, legitimacy as a phrase found in legal sources,45 and accessibility
to the lay subject of the law of contract.
Despite these facts to commend it and the endorsement of the legendary Master
of the Rolls, the attempt to consolidate the individual doctrines using inequality
of bargaining power ultimately got, in McKendrick’s phrase, a “frosty reception
in the appellate courts”.46 In Bundy itself, the majority declined to pass judgment
on it, instead resolving the case as undue influence. Later revisiting the question
in Alec Lobb, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion, and made clear that Lord
Denning himself never intended that inequality of bargaining power, without more,
should be enough.47 Again in Morgan, the House of Lords expressly disapproved
it.48
There may be good reasons for this. Though relevant in the ways discussed, it
is difficult to see how inequality of bargaining power could accurately be said to
encapsulate the individual doctrines.
To the extent it might be cast as an underlying legally-required element, it is
at most confined to unconscionability and presumed undue influence, where in
both cases it plays a limited role. As noted, inequality of bargaining power can be
seen as inherent in unconscionability’s question of whether one party was under
a certain disadvantage,49 and presumed undue influence’s question of whether the
parties’ relationship was of a kind typified by influence.50 But in both cases, the
presence of such inequality is not enough to answer these questions. In presumed
undue influence, it must be found in an existing relationship, of a type where the
inequality rose to the level of dependence. And in unconscionability, it must reside
within (or analogously to) certain categories of quite serious weakness of the
disadvantaged party.
Within unconscionability and presumed undue influence, the role of inequality
of bargaining power (in the described forms) is further limited in that it is just one
of the necessary elements for relief. Both doctrines additionally require misconduct
by the stronger party—abuse of the inequality of bargaining position, as Cartwright
casts it.51 To establish this misconduct, the doctrines furthermore seek proof of a
striking substantive disparity in the bargain. These additionally-required elements
45
Friedrich Kessler, “Contracts of Adhesion: Some thoughts about Freedom of Contract” (1943) 43 Colum. L.
Rev. 629 at 631–632; UCC para.2-302, comment 1; Lowe v Lombank [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196; [1960] 1 All E.R. 611;
Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture 350 F.2d 445 (1965) (D.C. Cir.); Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay
[1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308 at 1316; [1974] 3 All E.R. 616 at 624 per Lord Diplock.
46
McKendrick, Contract Law (2015), at p.303.
47
Alec Lobb v Total Oil [1983] 1 W.L.R. 87 per Lord Dillon: “Nothing leads me to suppose that the course of the
development of the law over the last 100 years has been such that … relief will now be granted in equity in a case
such as the present if there has been unequal bargaining power, even if the stronger has not used his strength
unconscionably … Lord Denning did not envisage that any contract entered into in such circumstances would, without
more, be reviewed”.
48
National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] 1 A.C. 686.
49
See e.g., Strydom v Vendside [2009] 6 Costs L.R. 886 at [36].
50
Re Craig [1971] Ch. 95; Geffen v Goodman Estate [1991] 2 S.C.R. 353.
51
Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining: A Study of Vitiating Factors in the Formation of Contracts (1991). See also:
Alec Lobb v Total Oil [1983] 1 W.L.R. 87; Carter, Contract Law in Australia (2012), at p.525.
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exist because, crucially and appropriately, the law recognises that even where there
is an inequality of bargaining power, it will not always be unfairly leveraged in
the making of a contract. Inequality of bargaining power creates a potential for
exploitive dealing. But circumstances ripe for exploitation are not always exploited.
Thus the additionally-required elements pursue the separate inquiry of whether
the contract at hand shows signs of indeed having been tainted by abuse of the
inequality of bargaining power.
Meanwhile, within the other two doctrines of duress and actual undue influence,
there is no requirement of inequality of bargaining power at all. They do not inquire
into the position of the parties. As noted, an inequality will not uncommonly be
factually present. But legally, the two doctrines do not concern themselves with
it. What they do share with unconscionability and presumed undue influence is a
concern with misconduct, whether improper pressure (in duress) or influence (in
actual undue influence). Inequality of bargaining power, as noted, represents only
a potential for misconduct. This is why unconscionability and presumed undue
influence start with it, but then go on to ask whether the substantive bargain
suggests that this potential for abuse materialised. Duress and actual undue influence
need not “speculate” via presumptions drawn from a risk and a result as to whether
misconduct occurred, for they directly pursue positive proof of the misconduct.
It could plausibly be claimed that a person under coercion or influence has
diminished bargaining power as a result. This is another example of how inequality
of bargaining power often factually attends the circumstances. But it is important
to distinguish where inequality of bargaining power is the result of, rather than the
opportunity for, the misconduct which the doctrines require.52 Further, one can
imagine coercion and influence cases where the affected parties do not bargain at
all; they are simply doing the will of the exploiting party, or substantially so. In
these cases, bargaining power is under-inclusive as a concept for capturing the
scope of the doctrines’ concerns.
Meanwhile in other cases, it is over-inclusive, for it overreaches the sum of the
doctrines. Many circumstances of inequality of bargaining power fall outside all
of the doctrines. Indeed, there are even cases of severe inequality of bargaining
power where none of the individual doctrines, with their several criteria, apply.53
Inequality of bargaining power therefore does not work as a principle which
synthesises existing law; rather, it would significantly change it. Conceptually,
bargaining power simply does not correspond with the mischief targeted, which
52
I thank Stephen Smith for spurring an example which helps to illustrate this: assume there is inequality of
bargaining power where a man is in necessity, overboard drowning in icy water, whilst offered rescue at an excessive
fee. Smith asks whether inequality of bargaining power is not likewise present in a coercion scenario where the
“rescuer” threw the man overboard before offering rescue for the fee? There is, but it is a symptom, rather than the
cause, of the defect in this contract’s formation. To see this, suppose that, as they clasp hands, the man overboard
threatens to pull the “rescuer” into the icy water unless the rescuer pays the man overboard double the rescue fee. If
the threat is carried out, both men will drown. Their bargaining power is equal. But this contract, like the contract
for rescuing the man overboard after throwing him in, will be invalid for duress.
More generally, suppose a weaker party (W) with bargaining power X, and a stronger party (S) with bargaining
power X + n. If W engages in some conduct so as to reduce S’s bargaining power by n, then W and S now have
exactly equal bargaining power, X. Yet a contract formed under these circumstances would be voidable for duress.
Thus, at a minimum, the coercion and influence cases are concerned with a diminishment of bargaining power, rather
than an inequality.
53
Namely where there is no pre-existing relationship, no illegitimate pressure, and no infirmity recognised by
unconscionability. Consider the modern prevalence of “contracts of adhesion”: Kessler, “Contracts of Adhesion:
Some thoughts about Freedom of Contract” (1943) 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629. The same would be true of a severe
diminishment of bargaining power, unknown to the other, and short of incapacity.
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is constraint on a party’s autonomy exploited by the other party. For these reasons,
inequality of bargaining power must be rejected as the common principle uniting
duress, undue influence, and unconscionability.

2. Lord Denning’s “mongrel” principle
Beyond this label of “inequality of bargaining power” that captured the interest
of others, Lord Denning himself went on to detail a more complex principle in
Bundy which he proposed to unite duress, undue influence, and unconscionability.
He described it thus:
“[T]hrough all these instances there runs a single thread … [T]he English law
gives relief to one who, without independent advice, enters into a contract
upon terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration
which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired
by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity,
coupled with undue influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for
the benefit of the other.”54
Neil Andrews refers to the principle as a “mongrel”,55 because it blends together
three breeds of requirement: (1) gross substantive unfairness; (2) grievously weak
bargaining power; and (3) illegitimate pressure or influence.
It should be evident that this Denning formulation does gather together themes
from the different individual doctrines. It takes two steps in the right direction
from inequality of bargaining power simpliciter. The first is that mere unequal
bargaining power does not suffice. This is implicit in the qualifier “grievous” that
he applies to the inequality. And indeed, the two doctrines that may be seen as
requiring inequality of bargaining power do so suggest—a relationship of
dependence in the case of presumed undue influence, and a disability of the weaker
party in unconscionability. The second step is the addition of an element of
wrongdoing by the benefiting party, which as discussed, is required by each of the
doctrines in some form.
Yet this more nuanced formulation has not gained a foothold in the courts,
displacing the individual doctrines, any more than the label of inequality of
bargaining power. I would suggest that this is principally because the more complex
principle improperly cumulates alternative criteria for rescission. In other words,
the problem is not that it is a mongrel, but that it is a two-headed dog.
In particular, Lord Denning’s third condition, which refers to undue pressure
or influence, should be sufficient on its own, via either duress or actual undue
influence respectively, to avoid a contract. Yet in Denning’s proposed formulation,
the contract is not thereby avoided unless his other two conditions are also fulfilled.
And conversely, Denning’s other two conditions of substantive disproportion
plus serious inequality of bargaining power, should, via either unconscionability
or presumed undue influence (according to the nature of the inequality), support
a presumption which substitutes for the need to prove his remaining condition of
wrongdoing, absent proof to the contrary.
54
55

Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326 at 339.
Andrews, Contract Law (2015), at p.317.
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As it is put in Anson:
“Denning’s test requires procedural and substantive unfairness, whereas
duress and undue influence require only the former, and presumed undue
influence uses substantive unfairness only to place on the stronger party the
burden to justify the contract where there is no evidence of actual undue
influence.”56
Similarly for unconscionability.
In Pt III.1, I described two alternate approaches to establishing a right to rescind
the contract: (1) direct, by proving illegitimate pressure (duress) or influence (actual
undue influence) or (2) indirect, by proving relative positions comprising a high
risk of exploitation, coupled with a suspiciously disproportionate bargain, so that
without an alternate explanation, the law presumes that the risk of exploitation
materialised. Lord Denning’s complex formulation compounds the two, forcing
one claimant to satisfy two different guard-dogs with opposing fixations before
gaining entry. Cumulating what are supposed to be alternate conditions, Denning’s
more detailed formulation does not conform to existing law, but would make it
significantly more restrictive.

3. Waddams’ “unfairness” theory of unconscionability
Denning’s attempts in Bundy to consolidate the doctrines discussed here also
included cases of expectant heirs and salvage agreements—both niche areas where
special rules authorise courts to grapple directly with a contract’s substantive
fairness.57 The year after Bundy, Stephen Waddams proposed effectively to extend
Denning’s unification effort by including a number of additional special rules with
similar import from other niche areas including forfeitures, penalties, deposits,
and limitation clauses.58
Waddams’ approach to consolidation is to elevate one of the
doctrines—unconscionability—and stretch it so as to fit the others inside it.59 He
is not alone in suggesting this as a possible way of proceeding; Rick Bigwood and
Justice Phang, for example, have also done so.60 Others such as David Capper
suggested that the elements could be treated as non-essential factors, rather than
conditions, with the court weighing everything and “making an overall judgment
as to whether a transaction can stand”.61 The greater subjectivity inherent in
Capper’s version brings us close to Waddams’ view that “large inequality of
exchange, combined with inequality of bargaining power … goes a long way to
suggest a case for relief”;62 albeit not determinative, this would burden the benefiting
56

Anson’s Law of Contract (2010), at pp.375–376.
Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326 at 337–339.
Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts” (1976) 39 M.L.R. 369.
59
Indeed, his text uncommonly organises these subjects in that way: Waddams, Law of Contracts (2010), Ch.14.
This interestingly differs from Denning’s approach of proposing a new meta-principle overarching each individual
doctrine. The two approaches might not be so disparate, however: the three conditions in Denning’s principle are
more or less the same as those in the Commonwealth doctrine of unconscionability; what mainly separates them is
Denning’s cumulation of all three conditions and omission of a rule alleviating the need to prove wrongdoing when
the other two conditions are satisfied.
60
Bigwood, “Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?” (1996) 16 O.J.L.S. 503; Andrew
Phang, “Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages” [1995] J.B.L. 552.
61
David Capper, “Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation” (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 479 at 500.
62
Waddams, Law of Contracts (2010), at para.545.
57
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party with proving, on the contrary, that the disadvantaged party was independently
advised or intended a partial gift. Among these factors, the emphasis is on
substantive unfairness: Waddams’ general principle is that “a contract may be set
aside if it produces consequences that are very unfair”.63
Waddams’ proposal makes what seems a key contribution to the search for a
common principle by recognising that unconscionability is conceptually the
broadest of the doctrines, and a necessary focal point of any attempt at
consolidation. Bigwood does not see an enveloping doctrine of unconscionability
as the solution, and Cartwright does not view unconscionability as ultimately
concerned with substantive fairness rather than wrongdoing, and on both points I
agree. However, there is something in Waddams’ approach that seems pivotal.
Namely, I believe the common principle sought is most likely to be accurately
identified by trying better to understand the theoretically-broad unconscionability
in relation to the other doctrines, rather than by simply aggregating the conditions
of the individual doctrines and eliding duplicate requirements.
Like the two Denning formulations, Waddams’ proposal has not been accepted
by the jurisprudence, apart from the special areas he cites. He acknowledges this,
but counters that there is no principled basis for why relief is confined to these
areas, and hence “general recognition of this ground is an essential step in the
development of the law”.64
However, the courts may have sound reasons for their reluctance. One concern
may be that the proposal seems indiscriminately to mix general rules and special
rules. Another could be that it requires inverting what in existing law appears to
be a conscious allocation of the roles of principle and exception.
On the first point, if within the same area, there are both general rules and
special rules of law, the assumption would ordinarily be that there is an essential
difference in the special rules’ vocation and operation, in order to justify their
existence. It cannot be assumed that the general and special rules are accidental
expressions of a common principle.65 If they are, something must explain this.
Special rules indeed often exist precisely as exceptions to the general rules, in
some important respect expressed or implied.
Here, duress, undue influence, and the Commonwealth doctrine of
unconscionability are general rules which apply to any type of contract, based on
relatively abstract criteria, and are agnostic as to the contract’s particular content.
Forfeitures, penalties, deposits, and limitation clauses are special rules which apply
only in confined circumstances, and which each require specific contractual content
which they respectively define. The proposed principle, substantive unfairness,
may fit well the special rules, but seems a challenging fit for the general rules: we
have already noted the other elements they require. Waddams himself seems to
acknowledge unfairness might not be a complete picture, stating that:
“not every case lends itself to analysis in terms of equality of exchange and
sometimes it may be that there is a case for relief even when the values
exchanged are approximately equal”.66
63

Waddams, Law of Contracts (2010), at paras 545 and 542.
Waddams, Law of Contracts (2010), at para.443.
At least, aside from a principle so abstract as to be practically meaningless as a rule, e.g. “justice”.
66
Waddams, Law of Contracts (2010), at para.545.
64
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Moreover, substantive unfairness is not a requirement for duress or actual undue
influence, and within unconscionability and presumed undue influence, its express
purpose is only to confirm an apprehended risk of exploited bargaining anomalies.
This connects with the second point: Waddams says that courts are reluctant
to recognise a principle of substantive unfairness due to what he sees as an inflated
concern with stability of contract.67 He therefore seems to accept that the common
law privileges stability—reflected in myriad judicial pronouncements in this vein:
“to make inadequacy of consideration of itself a distinct principle of relief in
equity … Courts of Equity … would throw everything into confusion and set
afloat all the contracts of mankind”.68
Forfeitures, penalties, deposits, limitation clauses and other cases Waddams cites
where substantive fairness prevails are thus special exceptions to the general rule
favouring contractual stability.
Even for these exceptions, there need not be a unified rational explanation,
other than that each is limited enough not to upset the general principle of stability.
Duress, undue influence, and unconscionability, being general principles, are not
so limited. To accept substantive unfairness as the underlying principle they apply,
and to police contracts on that basis, would turn the exception into the rule and
the rule into the exception: stability would be confined to the interstices where
courts find no unfairness.

4. Cartwright’s “abuse” of inequality principle
Joining the list of experts who perceive that “there may be some common principle
which underlies these areas of the law which have developed separately” is John
Cartwright. However, Cartwright emphasises that “neither an unfair bargain”, as
Waddams proposes, “nor an inequality between the parties’ bargaining positions”,
as in the simpler of the claims attributed to Denning, “of themselves vitiate a
contract. What is required is an abuse of that inequality”. Thus, in seeking what
unifies duress, undue influence, and unconscionability, Cartwright uncovers “the
key element” as being “the link between the unequal position of the parties and
the bargain: the abuse of that position of inequality”. Cartwright therefore espouses
that “an illegitimate advantage-taking by one party underlies [these] separate
areas”.69
This conception’s focus on abuse contributes significantly to the quest for
Denning’s grail of a common principle, for as Cartwright observes:
“the principle which underlies the cases in this area is not simply one of public
policy against inequality of bargaining power, or the unfair terms of contract.
The cases consistently refer to the advantage taken by one party of the other”.70

67

Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts” (1976) 39 M.L.R. 369.
Griffith v Spratley (1787) 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 383 at 388; 29 E.R. 1213 at 1215.
Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining: A Study of Vitiating Factors in the Formation of Contracts (1991), at pp.215,
220 and 219.
70
Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining: A Study of Vitiating Factors in the Formation of Contracts (1991), at p.214;
see also Carter, Contract Law in Australia (2012), at p.525.
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The law “suffers no man to overreach another, [but] helps no man who hath
overreached himself without any practice or contrivance of his adversary”.71
Cartwright acknowledges that presumed undue influence and unconscionability
do permit inequality of bargaining power together with substantive disparity to
support a presumption which can void a contract. But “that presumption is that
there has been an abuse”,72 and is rebuttable by proof that the contract was formed
in a fair manner. Indeed, an “innocent” party, ignorant that the other party joined
the contract through abuse by a third party, may enforce it.73
Like the previously surveyed formulations, Cartwright’s proposed means of
unifying duress, undue influence, and unconscionability has not earned the favour
of the jurisprudence so as to displace the individual doctrines.
Again it seems that reasons can be found why this might be so. One reason,
detailed in Pt III.1, is that the doctrines do not all require inequality of bargaining
position: unconscionability and presumed undue influence do, but duress and actual
undue influence do not. Evidently, Cartwright’s theory implies that the improper
conduct proscribed by duress and actual undue influence be understood as in
essence abuse of unequal bargaining position. However, this seems a difficult
proposition, since these doctrines do not inquire into the parties’ positions;
potentially, the court may not even know the positions.
As for the improper pressure or influence they do investigate, these must affect
the parties’ freedom to decide whether to enter the contract, because of the
doctrines’ causation requirements. To add that this “interference” sought and found
arises from abuse of unequal bargaining position, being the true ground of
invalidity, would seem to position the cart before the horse: the foundation of
enforceability is freedom of contract, not equal bargaining power. As noted in Pt
III.1, unconscionability and presumed undue influence inquire into unequal
bargaining position because they pertain to high risk scenarios for the weaker party
being unable to bargain freely. Where, as in duress and actual undue influence,
constraint on freedom of contract can be directly proven, there is no need to look
for risks and results of such as grounds for indirectly inferring its occurrence. This
is further supported by the fact that duress and actual undue influence may ignore
not only bargaining positions, but also substantive results: they allow avoidance
of a contract even where there is no substantive disparity, so long as the required
element of “compulsion” is found.
Moreover, compulsion (in the loose sense used in the cases) is a broader notion
than abuse of unequal bargaining position, not vice versa. The latter is but one
way to effect such compulsion. Holding a gun to someone’s head is entirely another.
And presumably, the party wielding the gun is normally in the weaker position,
otherwise it would not have needed it. In sum, because Cartwright’s theory casts
the required element of wrongdoing as an abuse of inequality of bargaining position,
it does not escape the problems noted with that concept.
Alternatively, more amorphous definitions of wrongdoing, as the central element
of a proposed formulation,74 would risk frustrating the reason for uniting the
71

Maynard v Moseley (1676) 3 Swans. 651; 36 E.R. 1009.
Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining: A Study of Vitiating Factors in the Formation of Contracts (1991), at p.214.
Waddams, Law of Contracts (2010), at para.509.
74
Formulations could be imagined similar to Cartwright’s in its focus on wrongdoing, except not pinned to abuse
of unequal bargaining position, rather more agnostic as to the nature of the wrongdoing. For instance, Conaglen,
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doctrines—to identify what analytically drives them, while making it simpler to
predict and explain when a contract can or cannot be avoided.

5. Conaglen’s power imbalance “continuum”
Unlike the proposals reviewed thus far, Matthew Conaglen’s does not propose to
combine duress, undue influence, and unconscionability into one “conglomerate
doctrine”. He supports their separateness. Responding to renewed calls by others
for their union, he allows that the doctrines are “definitely … unified in their
general concern … and there is a considerable amount of overlap between them”.
He even acknowledges that their union “may yet occur in the future”. What stands
in the way, in his view, is the “important methodological difference” that duress
and actual undue influence look only at “procedural” unfairness, whereas
unconscionability and presumed undue influence also consider “substantive”
unfairness. His formulation is therefore a proposed theoretical distinction between
these pairs of doctrines that explains their methodological difference and supports
their separation. If this is not possible, he concedes that “careful consideration
would have to be given to discarding the differences among the doctrines in favour
of a unified doctrine”.75
Like most of the theories tracing back to Denning’s in Bundy, Conaglen’s fixates
on inequality of bargaining power. But he sees it as a matter of degree: the
relationships among the doctrines are explained by locating them along a continuum
according to the degree of power imbalance they embody. Specifically, each
doctrine “implement[s], at varying levels of strength, the principle of protection
against exploitation of those power imbalances”.76
One pole of his continuum he calls “the contractual end”, where parties are
equal, and no policing is necessary. Progressing up the continuum, a point is
reached where the power imbalance is sufficient that the doctrines of duress and
actual undue influence are needed to police transactions to ensure “procedural
propriety”: that is, “whether the parties have acted in an acceptable fashion towards
each other in reaching whatever result they have arrived at”. They look only at
formation and not substance because of the law’s “respect for the autonomous
decisions of adult human beings”. Progressing still further up the power imbalance
continuum to what he calls the “fiduciary end”, the doctrines of unconscionability
and presumed undue influence police transactions. Here, the parties’ relationship
is “close to being, if indeed it is not actually, a fiduciary relationship”. Hence:

whose overall view will be discussed in Pt III.5, suggests a more general definition of wrongdoing inspired by the
Canadian case Harry v Kreutziger [1978] B.C.J. No.1318, referencing conduct “sufficiently divergent from community
standards of commercial morality that [the contract] should be rescinded”. However, this definition offers minimal
direction, and is unified only in the conclusory words it uses to mask a vague and unknown analysis. Such are no
doubt among the reasons Canada’s Supreme Court has shifted Canadian law away from such precepts: see e.g., R v
Labaye [2005] S.C.J. No.83; [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 (dealing with indecency). Conaglen, perhaps reluctant to rest so
much on that amorphous formulation, adds that “put another way, the [doctrines] are all examples of duties of good
faith”: “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R. 509
at 541. Yet this only reinforces concerns about vagueness, for good faith is much broader than the aggregate of duress,
undue influence, and unconscionability, and it is uncertain what good faith might mean in this context.
75
Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R.
509.
76
Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R.
509.
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“there is greater concern for the inability of the weaker party to exercise his
autonomy intelligently and to protect his own interests from abuse by the
other [of the relationship’s extreme power imbalance]”.
In those cases, the law will intervene if it further identifies “a substantive problem
in the transaction [because] the weaker of the two parties is not trusted to be capable
of exercising the autonomy which the law respects” in cases short of this pole of
the continuum.77
Conaglen’s theoretical grapple with the doctrines is a valiant one: in pursuing
nuances between them that might justify their discreteness, he arrives at profound
insights into the doctrines’ operation, inter-relation, and motivations. Ironically,
but as he expressly foresaw as the possible result, these contribute what seem to
me the final clues necessary to see why and how the doctrines should be united
into a common principle. One of these key insights is his compelling demonstration
that the essential legal as opposed to merely factual distinction among the doctrines
is between the two methodological approaches he identifies. Another is the critical
attention brought to the issue of the autonomy of the parties in forming the contract.
But even while preserving the separation of the doctrines, the jurisprudence
has not rallied around Conaglen’s theory as a way of explaining their overlaps but
justifying their distinctions. In my view, there exist good reasons why the
jurisprudence has not done so.
To begin with, it seems questionable that existing law’s inclination towards
party autonomy versus paternalistic policing of contract corresponds to the degree
of power imbalance. For example, within Conaglen’s formulation, where no
doctrine applies is where none is needed because of equal bargaining power. But
in reality, as noted earlier, many contracts are made with extreme power imbalances
and yet none of the doctrines apply.
In addition, the theory places duress and actual undue influence at a point of
significant, albeit not extreme, inequality of bargaining position. But, as discussed,
these doctrines do not require inequality, and may apply without any, or ignorant
as to whether there is any. If it was a requirement of these two doctrines, one might
expect them to require proof of this moderate imbalance, as the other two doctrines
require proof of a severe imbalance (in the form each governs). Conversely, one
might argue that Conaglen unconsciously but implicitly recognises that duress and
actual undue influence need not involve any power imbalance since he agrees they
need not look beyond the “procedure” by which contractual consent was obtained:
if these doctrines required moderate power imbalances, one might expect them
also to examine the substantive bargain, except to assign less weight to what
inference should be drawn from it than the doctrines do at his fiduciary end.
Conaglen’s answer is that the substantive result need not be considered because
an allegation of duress or actual undue influence “does not raise concerns about
taking advantage of an inability to exercise autonomous distributive power over
one’s assets”.78 However, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance that should more
raise such concern than the duress archetype of having to decide with a gun to
77
Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R.
509 at 538–539.
78
Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R.
509 at 537.
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one’s head. Indeed, the partial “compulsion” that characterises all cases of duress
and actual undue influence directly derogates from that autonomy. It may not fit
the label “fiduciary”, but what could more clearly justify similar dependence,
regardless of bargaining position, than acting under another’s compulsion?79
Another seeming problem with this theory of the doctrines’ distinctions is that
a given set of facts could satisfy the requirements of more than one
doctrine—putting it in two places of the continuum at one time. Ultimately,
Conaglen seems aware that the theory is flawed, acknowledging that distinctions
between the doctrines cannot be explained solely by reference to degrees of power
imbalance.80 In light of his theory’s penetrating insights plus the additional
illumination emanating from gaps in the theory’s explanations for what
distinguishes the doctrines, I accede to Conaglen’s ergo that without a viable
distinguishing theory, the doctrines should be unified.

IV. A Refined Conception of the Unifying Principle: Exploitation
of Constrained Decisional Autonomy
Until now, the courts have not embraced any yet-articulated formulation of the
principle many experts believe unites duress, undue influence, and
unconscionability. However, as those same experts have often said, it may be that
the courts will yet do so in the future. With this in mind, I turn to articulating a
refined conception of the common principle—one that seems to avoid apparent
flaws of prior formulations, and accurately capture the nature and functioning of
each of the individual doctrines. The crucial distinction of this conception from
prior formulations is that it focuses not on bargaining power, but on decisional
autonomy.

1. Principle and test
Duress, undue influence, and unconscionability all exist and operate according to
the following common principle: A contract may be avoided where it is formed
by one party exploiting a severe constraint in the other party’s decisional autonomy
regarding whether to consent to the contract.
This unified principle allows for a single test. The single test should ask:
(1)

(2)

Was the party which seeks to avoid the contract seriously constrained
from exercising its autonomy to decide whether to consent to the
contract, as a result of pressure (as in duress), influence (as in undue
influence), disability (as in unconscionability), or other factors, at
the time it gave the consent?
If so, was its seriously constrained autonomy exploited by the other
party (as required by all the individual doctrines), through (actually

79
Compulsion by the other party in the contract, that is. The label “fiduciary” may have developed in other areas
of private law and been used for certain relationship-types but should not obscure the function of identifying
circumstances of justifiable dependence.
80
Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R.
509 at 533. Regarding a fact-scenario fitting two spots of the continuum, suppose a litigant has proven that they were
the weaker party in a relationship of presumed undue influence, and has evidence proving actual undue influence.
The degree of power imbalance the theory supposes existed between the parties would nonsensically change based
on the irrelevant fact of whether the litigant elects to adduce the evidence proving actual undue influence or instead
evidence of the disparate bargain calling the court to presume influence.
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or constructively) knowing of the constraint yet failing to take
appropriate steps to ensure the consent received was sheltered from
it in forming the contract?
The party seeking to avoid the contract may establish these elements via:
(a)
(b)

Direct proof (as in duress or actual undue influence); or
Legal presumption, where (as in unconscionability or presumed
undue influence) the party: (i) is in a position relative to the other
party that the law generally deems or the evidence in the case proves
is one where typically a party’s autonomy would be constrained and
vulnerable to exploitation by the other party; and (ii) proves that the
substantive bargain is grossly disproportionate in favour of the other
party; unless (iii) the party seeking to uphold the contract proves the
contract was not the result of this exploitation.

2. Details and explanations
This account of how the common principle ought to be conceived, and of a test
which could apply it, gives rise to questions that must be clarified as to the meaning
of its key terms and operational details.

i) Autonomy
In all these doctrines, the commonly-perceived contractual vice is not inequality
of bargaining power as the parties head into the formation process, but constraint
of one party’s autonomy within that very process of deciding whether to consent.
By “autonomy”, I mean the party’s freedom to consider whether to consent to
the contract. By “decisional”, I mean autonomy only in respect of deciding whether
to join the contract at issue, not autonomy in another sense or in general as in
incapacity.81
“Constraint” of such autonomy comprises external constraint, be it the
illegitimate pressure in duress, the improper influence in undue influence, or
desperate circumstances such as poverty or necessity which unconscionability
recognises as freedom-constraining. It comprises also internal constraint of the
autonomous faculty as a result of impairments such as illness, ignorance, illiteracy,
or senility covered by unconscionability. Constraint includes active interference
with one’s autonomy by the other party, as in duress or in undue influence cases
involving manipulation. It also includes impairment deriving from the condition
or circumstances of the affected party, as in unconscionability or in undue influence
cases where the influencing party merely knew of the other’s special vulnerability,
and failed to emancipate it in the making of the contract.
By “serious” constraint, I mean, similarly to Mason J. in Commercial Bank of
Australia Ltd v Amadio,82 to exclude lesser restrictions on autonomy as a result of
81
“Decisional” is used similarly, for instance, with regard to decisions of patients in Health Law, of subsidiaries
in Company Law, and of adjudicative bodies in discussions of judicial/tribunal independence.
82
Mason J. there said: “I qualify the word ‘disadvantage’ by the adjective ‘special’ in order to disavow any
suggestion that the principle applies whenever there is some difference in the bargaining power of the parties, and in
order to emphasize that the disabling condition or circumstance is one which seriously affects the ability of the
innocent party to make a judgment” (see (1983) 151 C.L.R. 447 at 462).
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the ordinary pressures, influences, and adverse external and internal circumstances
that bear on every decision, and which would not be covered by any vitiating
doctrine. I also mean, conversely, to exclude the more extreme or total lack of
autonomy of incapacity.
These notions must be distinguished from related ones such as consent and
intent, for Patrick Atiyah is right that:
“the victim of the modern mugger who surrenders his wallet with a knife at
his throat certainly knows what he is doing, and he intends to do it”.83
The issue is not voluntariness, but deliberative freedom in the process of deciding
one’s will.
That constrained autonomy animates these vitiating doctrines makes sense
given that autonomy is the essential precondition for the consent that creates valid
contracts. To borrow Bigwood’s phrase, “in our law, [and] in relation to contract
law in particular”, autonomy is “synonymous with the notion of responsibility”.84
By contrast, inequality of bargaining power cannot explain the doctrines, for
it only indirectly addresses and is insufficient to answer whether there are grounds
to avoid a contract. It creates a risk that the stronger party will allow its superiority
to constrain the weaker’s autonomy in deciding whether to contract, or to affect
the terms (i.e. what contract). But the stronger party might not do so. This is why
unconscionability and presumed undue influence must go further, and examine
the substantive bargain for evidence this risk materialised. Moreover, no matter
how extreme the inequality of bargaining power, these doctrines will not apply
unless it takes the form of a relationship of dependence (presumed undue influence)
or qualifying disability (unconscionability). What do those scenarios have in
common? The weaker party actually has constrained decisional autonomy, through
disability or influence. Meanwhile, unequal bargaining power is not the only way
that autonomy may be constrained: pressure (duress) or proven influence (actual
undue influence) are sufficient without any necessary inquiry into bargaining
position. Inequality of bargaining power’s significance is thus confined to its
relevance to constrained autonomy.
Despite the fever around inequality of bargaining power which has dominated
debate on these doctrines since Bundy, antecedents of the alternate suggestion
espoused here of constrained decisional autonomy do seem to exist. Academic
intuitions broadly in this vein can be found across a range of prior discussions,
marginalised and unperfected perhaps due to distraction with Lord Denning’s red
herring of bargaining power. Indeed, back in 1876, Sir Frederick Pollock said:
“The question to be decided in each case is whether the party was a free and
voluntary agent. Any influence brought to bear upon a person entering into
an agreement, which, having regard to the … nature of the transaction, and
all the circumstances of the case, appears to have been such as to preclude
83

P. Atiyah, “Economic Duress and the ‘Overborne Will’” (1982) 98 L.Q.R. 197 at 200.
Bigwood, “Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?” (1996) 16 O.J.L.S. 503 at 506. It
is also reflected, for example, in recent Australian case law where courts, in addressing whether the weakness of the
party seeking rescission qualifies as a disability recognised under unconscionability, have asked themselves whether
the party was able to make a judgment in his best interests; see Begbie v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd [1993]
ASC 56-254; [1994] A.T.P.R. 41-288; Teachers Health Investments Pty Ltd v Wynne [1996] ASC 56-356; [1996]
N.S.W. Conv. R. 55-785; Geelong Building Society v Thomas (1996) V. Conv.R. 54-545; Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 62; (2002) 117 F.C.R. 301.
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the exercise of free and deliberate judgment, is considered by the courts of
equity to be undue influence, and is a ground for setting aside the act procured
by its employment.”85
Pollock was speaking only of undue influence, but a similar statement could
encompass all of the doctrines. Atiyah later came in range, writing that “in modern
times, these defences have sometimes been subsumed under the generic heading
of ‘cognitive weaknesses’”.86 However, this phraseology suggests a defect within
the mental faculty, ignoring the cases where the problem is rather an external
constraint. Peter Birks and Nyuk Yin Chin came conceptually near the mark in
describing a “capacity to consent [that] is excessively impaired”; but like Pollock,
they were speaking only of undue influence.87 Allan Farnsworth similarly stated
that “the ultimate question is whether the result was produced by means that
seriously impaired the free and competent exercise of judgment”; but in Pollock’s
footsteps, this again referred only to undue influence.88 Conaglen perceived that
in unconscionability besides presumed undue influence, “the weaker party is not
always in a position to exercise autonomy in her own best interests against the
other”. But he left out duress and actual undue influence where such autonomy is
likewise impaired, except by interference rather than position.89
The jurisprudence reaches perhaps even closer to autonomy in discussions it
has made of the doctrines. For example, of duress Lord Diplock said in The
Universe Sentinel that the “apparent consent was induced by pressure”; this
recognises that there does seem to be a consent, but one unfreely arrived at.90
Likewise, of undue influence it was said in Johnson v Buttress that “the transaction
was the outcome of such an actual influence over the mind of the plaintiff that it
cannot be considered his free act”.91 And of unconscionability, the High Court of
Australia stated in Amadio v Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd that: “[t]he weaker
party’s disadvantage exists precisely because he cannot determine what course of
action would be in his best interests in the circumstances”; the doctrine addressed
the “question as to the weaker party’s ability to make a judgment”.92
Ample precedential traces of a common principle of constrained autonomy can
thus be found in the jurisprudence, besides academic discussions that have come
near to it.

ii) Exploitation
Part III disclosed how each individual doctrine requires, under one or another term
used in the jurisprudence, wrongdoing: “[t]he cases consistently refer to the
85

F. Pollock, Principles of Contract at Law and Equity (London: Stevens, 1876), at pp.503–504.
P. Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), at p.330.
Birks and Chin, “On the Nature of Undue Influence” in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1997). Oddly,
they expressly denied any relation to unconscionability and duress.
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Farnsworth, Contracts (2004), at para.4.20. See also Peel, Treitel’s Law of Contract, 14th edn (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 2015), at para.10-014, who interprets undue influence as requiring only that the influenced party entered
the contract not as a matter of its own “free will”.
89
Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R.
509. Puzzlingly, he also concluded that unconscionability and presumed undue influence, by inquiring into substance,
infringe rather than ultimately protect autonomy.
90
Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation (The Universe Sentinel)
[1983] 1 A.C. 366 at 384.
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[1936] HCA 41; (1936) 56 C.L.R. 113 at 134 per Dixon J.
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(1983) 151 C.L.R. 447 at 461 per Mason J.
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advantage taken by one party of the other”.93 From among these terms, why choose
“exploitation” in articulating the common principle?
The alternatives to one side—terms like “morally reprehensible” and
“unconscionable”—emphasise moral blameworthiness in a way that seems at best
a distraction, and arguably a distortion of what the doctrines actually minimally
require. Take for example the disagreement between Birks and Chin who argue
that the conduct need not be “wicked,” and Bigwood and Conaglen who respond
that it cannot be innocent. This debate respectfully seems an unnecessary diversion
provoked by the aforementioned guilt-focused terms sometimes used. As discussed
earlier, the wrongful conduct may range in severity from threatening to murder
the other party to mere omission to ensure the party is sheltered from influence or
impairment. Once it is realised that constraint of a party’s autonomy is behind
concern about contracts made in conflict with these doctrines, the meaning of (or
at least the minimum of what constitutes) exploitation in this context becomes
clear: having (actual or constructive) knowledge of the other party’s constraint,
failing to take steps to ensure the party is sheltered from it, and nevertheless
concluding a contract with the party “improperly” in the sense that its formation
therefore lacks the autonomous conditions prescribed by contract law. This explains,
for example, why in cases like Cheese v Thomas94 a constrained party was able
avoid a transaction despite a court finding that the other party had not acted “in a
morally reprehensible way”.
Accommodating that reality, the term exploitation does not dwell on the nature
of the conduct beyond it being knowing, improper, and a means which contributes
to its desired end.95 This last aspect is useful, for it focuses attention on the critical
causal requirement between the conduct (knowledge of the constraint, failure to
ensure emancipation from it) and its relevant object: formation of the contract.
The relevant object is not advantages in specific terms, for duress and actual undue
influence do not so much as inquire of terms. Moreover, although unconscionability
and presumed undue influence do, the remedy is not to strike or modify those
terms but to rescind the whole contract.96 Thus, as Bigwood notes, to the extent
exploitation suggests an advantage obtained (or disadvantage caused), “the benefit
that results from … exploitation is the contract itself”.97
For this reason, alternate descriptors of wrongdoing to the other side of
exploitation—such as “undue benefit” or “unfair advantage”—should be avoided
due to the risk of potential misinterpretation as referring to terms: First, the “benefit”
or “advantage” could be misunderstood as referring to favourable terms rather
than procurement of the contract. And secondly, “undue” or “unfair” could be
confused as meaning an imbalance in consideration, so that substantive
disproportion might be thought sufficient grounds for rescission, even though none
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Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining: A Study of Vitiating Factors in the Formation of Contracts (1991), at p.214.
[1994] 1 W.L.R. 129; [1994] 1 All E.R. 95
The Oxford English Dictionary, “exploitation”.
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I am again grateful to Stephen Smith for inspiring an example which helps highlight this point. Suppose a party
by duress pressures another into a contract whereby the pressuring party actually overpays, relative to market value,
for the consideration it obtains. In the substance of the deal, there seems no exploitation. But just as the benefit
obtained is not defined by substantive advantage in the terms, yet by the contract itself, likewise exploitation refers
not to depriving the other party of substantive value but rather depriving it of its right to enter the contract freely.
97
Rick Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), at p.176.
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of the individual doctrines will void a contract if the party seeking to uphold it
was reasonably unaware of the other’s constrained autonomy.

iii) When exploitation should be presumed from substantive disparity
Unlike duress and actual undue influence, the doctrines of unconscionability and
presumed undue influence inquire into substantive disparity. However, it is critical
to appreciate that they vitiate no contract on the basis of it. Rather, all of the
doctrines rescind contracts for impropriety in the formation process, the latter two
indirectly and the former two directly.
Specifically, the role of substantive disparity in the latter two is evidential. It
must first have been proven that the parties’ relationship carried a risk of
exploitation: this could be because a party was disabled from accessing its
decisional autonomy due to an internal condition or external necessity (the case
of unconscionability); or it could be because the party’s autonomy was invaded
by improper influence (the case of presumed undue influence). In either scenario,
ordinary self-interested dealing by the consciously stronger party becomes
exploitation. As Bigwood notes, “at a certain point, it becomes unrealistic to
suppose” that in such a relationship there would not be exploitation.98 Thus, if a
striking substantive disparity is also present, the law presumes the contract at issue
resulted from materialisation of the apprehended risk of exploitation.99 That the
substantive disparity is but a “forensic tool”,100 and not in itself these doctrines’
concern, is further apparent in that the presumption can be rebutted by the benefiting
party proving that the contract was not the result of exploitation. This could occur,
for instance, by showing that the disadvantaged party had effective decisional
autonomy, in that it was free from influence with regards to the particular
transaction, or had independent legal advice.101 For these reasons, even
unconscionability and presumed undue influence apply, as McCamus says,
“essentially to problems of procedural” exploitation: “that is to say, to defects in
formation”.102 This again is why the remedy is not to alter terms but to void
contracts. All of this is consistent with the foundational principle of freedom of
contract.
Each doctrine’s focus on cases where exploitation of constrained autonomy
marred the formation process is what allows them to be united into a single
principle.
What, then, is to be made of the doctrines’ split between two different
methodologies, identified by Conaglen? The best answer is the simplest: they
represent different routes to proving the claim. Where, as in duress and actual
undue influence, direct evidence is available of misconduct constraining the
claimant’s autonomy, the mischief is proved. It is to accommodate circumstances
where the salient evidence is typically to be found in the hands of the other party
that the law alternatively accepts proof of a relation that risks exploitation combined
98
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with proof of substantive disparity which suggests that that risk materialised in
the transaction, as presumptive proof that the claimant’s decisional autonomy was
improperly constrained. The mischief is unchanged; only the onus shifts, as the
party defending the claim may resist it through proof that the claimant’s decision
was autonomous, or effectively so through access to independent legal advice.
For undue influence, this is transparent from recognition of a second avenue
employing presumptions plus onus-shifting with regard to direct evidence. The
relationships covered are ones deemed or proven to be of general influence, so
that if the contract at hand was free of influence, it would be an exception.
Meanwhile, a coinciding disparity in the substance of the bargain is compelling
evidence that that contract is no exception. In such circumstances, it is logically
consistent with the concern for exploitation of constrained autonomy underlying
these doctrines to shift the onus to the benefiting party to prove that somehow
there was no influence.
In unconscionability, it is because the exploitation takes such a passive form
that the onus must shift. The conduct, ordinary self-interested dealing, draws no
distinction from a perfectly validly-formed contract. Rather, the exploitation turns
on whether there was knowledge of the weaker party’s disability. While it is
difficult to prove knowledge, the disabilities covered by unconscionability should
in most cases be obvious to a bargaining partner. A striking disparity in the
substance of the bargain is then strong evidence that this knowledge was exploited
to procure the bargain made. Such a disparity is not normal among able parties;
these are bargains:
“such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other”.103
In court parlance, they “call for explanation.” The benefiting party is the one best
placed to explain: what it knew, and what steps it took to avoid taking advantage
of the disability. Hence, again it is logically consistent with the concern for
exploitation of constrained autonomy underlying these doctrines to shift the onus
in this circumstance to the party defending the claim, once the claimant has made
the prima facie case it must make, through proof of vulnerability and disparity, of
a risk of exploitation that presumably materialised.

3. How the common principle incorporates each individual doctrine
Returning to the elements of the individual doctrines, it can be seen that they are
reflected in the common principle described above. It captures the doctrine of
duress, because exercising illegitimate pressure to induce consent to a contract is
exploitation, and having “no realistic choice but to consent to the contract” means
one’s decisional autonomy has been seriously constrained. Likewise, it covers
undue influence, for improper influence constrains a party’s autonomy—seriously
if to the point of inducing consent to a contract, and exploitatively if done
knowingly. It also encompasses unconscionability, for a party under an applicable
disability has seriously constrained autonomy, and if the bargain is sufficiently
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disproportionate to suggest that the other party knowingly took advantage of the
disability to procure the bargain, this is exploitation.

V. Conclusion
1. Why unify the doctrines?
There are reasons to think that the law would benefit by consolidating these
doctrines, eliminating the individual rules and their differing elements and tests.
One is a broad consensus recognising the doctrines’ similarity, interrelation,
and overlap: “there are no clear demarcations between the doctrines … The
difference is only slight at times”.104 Indeed, several experts see no remaining
distinction between actual undue influence and modern duress.105 Others see no
meaningful difference between unconscionability and presumed undue influence.106
And still others see overlap between unconscionability and economic duress.107
Attempting to preserve the doctrines’ separation and delimitation by developing
each’s own definitional niceties has arguably only enhanced confusion:
McKendrick, for example, finds that:
“duress has been bedevilled by conceptual confusion, with the result that it
is not easy to identify its limits and it is not obvious that it is ready to play
the role which has been allocated to it”.
Likewise, he concludes that “although undue influence is a well-worn phrase, its
precise meaning is unclear; there are a number of obscurities”.108 Sir Kim Lewison
has similarly said that many misconceptions persist regarding it, even within the
upper echelons of the profession.109 And of unconscionability, Conaglen declares
that “one cannot gainsay the proposition that exact delimitation of the concept …
is no easy task”.110
This theoretical mess has carried over into practice. McCamus notes that for
claimants it is common and, given the theoretical situation, arguably “appropriate
to consider the application of two or even all three of the doctrines”.111 The present
editors of Anson, among others, have even argued that several cases dealt with as
undue influence should have been cases of unconscionability.112 McCamus believes
Bundy itself might be such a case.113 Indeed, the articulated terms of
unconscionability are so broad as to make its ambit vague—which may explain
104
Conaglen, “Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains: The Theoretical Mesh” (1999) 18 N.Z.U.L.R.
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how it could be applied faithfully but restrictively in England, and equally faithfully
but expansively in Australia (with Canada in between). Recalling the diversity of
situations which it has been said to cover, it could be argued that it is conceptually
incoherent, except as a residual category intended to capture vitiation cases
“missed” by the other doctrines, or as a conclusory label affixed to reasoning that
proceeded along undisclosed lines. But this begs the question, “missed” or
“conclusory” of analysis according to what rule embodying what logic of the law
of contract?
And so, conversely, it may be that replacing the individual rules with their
common underlying principle would improve the law’s conceptual clarity and
simplify litigation and adjudication. As Cartwright says:
“Lord Scarman may be right that it is not possible or desirable to abandon
the existing categories in favour of a single category … But once it is realised
that there is a general principle at work, underlying the several categories …
it helps to explain the coherence of the law.”
So long as the common principle is correctly identified, he adds, it would allow
for “a more sensible examination of the ways in which vitiating factors should—or
should not—be developed”.114
Presently, the various individual doctrines are excessively preoccupied with
particularised factual conditions that could lead to, but are not necessary for, the
result that matters legally: constrained autonomy exploited in the making of the
contract. Escaping the current confusing doctrinal distinctions tied to distracting
factual fixations reflecting the rules’ pre-convergence histories, and focusing
attention instead on the common principle that causes and explains the vice in
formation of contracts in all these cases, would achieve the aspirations Cartwright
described.
The unifying principle is not too abstract to provide an intelligible legal standard,
for (appropriately) it mirrors the freedom that is the fundamental condition for
valid formation of a contract. The individual doctrines depict fact-scenarios
illustrating how that defect could occur. While the common principle reveals the
rationale behind them and uniting them, it simultaneously distinguishes these from
other cases where different doctrines like mistake and misrepresentation vitiate
contracts—namely where the defect is not constraint of the ability to exercise
decisional autonomy, but unreliability of the informational field upon which that
autonomy is deployed. Grouping the doctrines into “clusters” relatable to these
two categories is already the norm in Contract treatises; the further step called for
is to recognise the implicit expert intuition that the group is linked by accurately
articulating the rationale that unites the members and animates their fact
context-specific operation.
An argument can always be made for precautionary further investigation before
action. But this seems a case that is “timely in the sense that the various lines of
cases are sufficiently well-established to support the generalisation”.115 Courts
could proceed incrementally: the common principle might at first be recognised
merely as an organising rationale for the existing doctrines; cases would be analysed
114
115
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and discussed in its terms, but officially decided under the subsisting sub-doctrines.
Over time, as it became apparent that the principle could deliver the same results,
whilst offering a cleaner analysis and clearer justification, the second step might
be seen as unnecessary and confidently laid away. The praiseworthy judicial instinct
towards caution is often well-served by such incrementalism.
But sometimes, cautionary concerns cut both ways. Reasons exist why this
could be one of those scenarios. Multiple experts perceive risks in delaying the
step of unifying the doctrines. For example, Capper says that, faced with the current
mess, “there are definite signs of the courts manipulating the … doctrines to ensure
that someone who should win does’.116 The common principle, whose inquiry is
less distracted with descriptive facts and more directly targeted to the criteria which
underlie the law’s determination in each case of when a contract should be voidable,
may offer judges a sharper tool for deciding these cases. In addition, McKendrick
worries that if a genuine common principle is not recognised, Commonwealth law
may instead go the US route, expanding and deforming unconscionability, which
“should not be encouraged”.117 An encompassing version of unconscionability
could absorb the other doctrines, but at the cost of being too unbounded to be
consistently applied without eviscerating freedom of contract, or else undermining
the rule of law if applied more sparingly than its terms suggest. The risk that a
judge, dissatisfied with the current doctrinal knot, might resort to this
rough-but-ready solution if delay in recognising the doctrines’ common principle
deprives him of a better-rationalised and substantively more faithful solution, is
what worries McKendrick. The Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent discussions
on unconscionability may lend support to McKendrick’s concern.118

2. Possible apprehensions?
Are there other reasons to be concerned about unifying the doctrines? Central to
Lord Scarman’s unfavourable response to the “inequality of bargaining power”
idea was worry about uncertainty, and hence, inconsistency, because there is always
inequality, so how much is enough?119 If the principle proposed here were simply
constrained autonomy, the same concern would arise. But the term “decisional”
narrows the focus to that which affected the formation process. The “exploitation”
requirement excludes voiding a contract where the party seeking to uphold it was
innocent. And the need for the constraint to be “serious” restricts the rule’s
application to a relatively small number of egregious cases. In truth, neither the
standard for avoidance nor the degree of uncertainty should differ from under the
existing individual doctrines. In duress, it is uncertain which pressures are
illegitimate, and how much leaves no realistic alternative. In undue influence, what
amounts to undue is notoriously uncertain. In unconscionability, it is uncertain
what disabilities are covered, and how great an imbalance is “overreaching”.
Unconscionability and undue influence are equitable doctrines, and modern duress
has expanded to be, in Bigwood’s phrase, “coterminous” with actual undue
116
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influence, so the individual doctrines themselves are all open-ended and requiring
of subjective determinations.120 In this context, a common principle actually enables
more certainty and consistency, for besides obviating conceptual and procedural
pitfalls arising from doctrinal overlap, the principled version of the open-ended
question at least directly addresses that which in every case must justify or not the
vitiation of a contract: the degree to which freedom of contract was improperly
constrained.
Lord Scarman criticised the bargaining power suggestion also on grounds that
people must be held to their promises.121 The advantage, as common principle, of
decisional autonomy is that it is the very foundation of which promises the law of
contract recognises. Thus, inquiring into its presence or absence should minimise
the risk of the law improperly enforcing un-free promises, and of it voiding
properly-free promises.
Some, like Conaglen, favour the doctrines’ continued separation because:
“[t]o combine them into a single unified doctrine will cause us to lose sight
of the policy considerations which underlie each of the doctrines”.122
Bigwood similarly observes that duress and undue influence deal with “deflected
volition” while unconscionability concerns “deficiency in rational or judgmental
capacity”.123 However, that distinction in fact highlights how both essentially
concern the autonomy to decide whether to enter the contract, being the fundamental
policy consideration regarding contract validity, and the only one underlying these
doctrines that is determinative of contract validity. Whether this occurred by
deflected volition or defective judgmental incapacity, whether caused by illegitimate
pressure, influence, or exploited disabilities, are facts irrelevant to the ultimate
question of contractual validity.
A final suggestion, again from Lord Scarman, is that because Parliament has
restricted freedom of contract in several areas, its restriction is the legislature’s
task.124 But this ignores that the existing case law doctrines already each operate
to restrict it. If these do embody a common principle, one which mirrors the
foundation of why courts enforce contracts lacking that formative defect, surely
it would be better for the case law to make that clear. Further, as Waddams notes,
legislation “tends, in practice, to be in particular fields [and] varying among
different jurisdictions”.125 Hence, not legislation but the common law is best placed
to recognise a general principle, and such that it will transcend all the boundaries
of statutory jurisdiction—especially helpful in core private law areas of daily
activity like Contract.

3. The Bottom Line
A single principle which rescinds a contract made by a party exploiting seriously
constrained decisional autonomy of the other would unify yet faithfully preserve
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the rationale and operation of the discrete doctrines of duress, undue influence,
and unconscionability. Recognising it would enhance the law’s coherence, clarify
and streamline invalidity claims, and facilitate their consistent adjudication.
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